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Abstract
We analyze the relation between earning forecast accuracy and expected profitability
of financial analysts. Modeling forecast errors with a multivariate Gaussian distribution, a
complete characterization of the payoff of each analyst is provided. In particular, closed-
form expressions for the probability density function, for the expectation, and, more gen-
erally, for moments of all orders are obtained. Our analysis shows that the relationship
between forecast precision and trading profitability need not to be monotonic, and that, for
any analyst, the impact on his expected payoff of the correlation between his forecasts and
those of the other market participants depends on the accuracy of his signals. Furthermore,
our model accommodates a unique full-communication equilibrium in the sense of Radner
(1979): if all information is reflected in the market price, then the expected payoff of all
market participants is equal to zero.
1 Introduction
Many empirical studies indicate that financial analysts differ in their forecast accuracy (see,
e.g., Stickel, 1992; Sinha et al., 1997), and that these differences are persistent over time (see
Mikhail et al., 2004). Therefore it is natural to ask how the forecast ability of an analyst
translates into the profitability of a trading strategy based on his advice. This question is ad-
dressed, e.g., in the works of Loh and Mian (2006) and Ertimur et al. (2007). Both papers rank
analysts according to their earnings forecast accuracy and show that the difference between
factor-adjusted returns resulting from recommendations in the highest accuracy quintile and
in the lowest accuracy quintile is significantly positive. However, as noted by Ertimur et al.
(2007), since both papers focus only on the contemporaneous relationship between accuracy
and profitability, the reported abnormal excess returns among analysts cannot be considered
as evidence for the existence of an implementable ex-ante trading strategy.
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Furthermore, a strand of literature reports that earning abnormal trading returns based on
the recommendations of financial analysts is by no means an easy task: Bradshaw (2004) shows
that although earning forecasts have the highest explanatory power for recommendations,
these projections have the least association with future excess returns; Barber et al. (2001)
and Mikhail et al. (2004) conclude that, after trading costs are taken into consideration, the
differences in trading performance among analysts become insignificant; Brown and Pfeiffer
(2008) argue that reported abnormal returns might be spurious due to the fact that forecast
errors are scaled by share prices.
To explain the absence of a clear positive relationship between forecast precision and trading
profitability one can simply invoke the efficient market hypothesis: if market prices reflect
correctly all available information, then, due to the level playing field, no market participant
can earn abnormal returns. The paradox of the efficient market hypothesis is that, if every
investor believed in the efficiency of the market, then the market would not be efficient because
no one would have an incentive to process information. This issue is addressed by Grossman and
Stiglitz (1980), who argues that the strong-form efficient market hypothesis is not a meaningful
assumption and that gathering information makes sense up to the point where its marginal
cost equals its marginal benefit.
Another natural way to analyze the problem is to consider inefficient markets. Different
simulation studies by Schredelseker (1984, 2001) and Pfeifer et al. (2009) show that for markets
out of equilibrium and with asymmetric information the relationship between forecast accuracy
and trading profitability might be non-monotonic. This could be an explanation of the fact
that linear or monotonic statistical measures, such as Pearson or Spearman correlation, detect
only weak or no dependence in the empirical data. The main findings were confirmed also in
experimental market settings, see Huber (2007) and Huber et al. (2008). Lawrenz and Weis-
sensteiner (2012) propose a theoretical model where agents learn, i.e. improve their forecast
abilities in a Bayesian sense. They use numerical integration to calculate the expected profit
of the single agents, and with a regression analysis they explain the result by forecast errors
of the single analyst, by forecast errors of the others and by correlation effects among market
participants. Surprisingly, existing empirical studies in this field seem to neglect the covariance
of the forecast errors as an important explanatory variable.
Let us now turn to the objectives of this work: we propose a one-period model with
asymmetric information, in the context of which we derive closed-form expressions for the
probability density function, the expectation, as well as all higher moments of the payoff
obtained by each market participant. We are not aware of other contributions in the literature
where such complete characterizations in a model with asymmetric information have been
obtained. Our analysis yields that any market participant benefits from a reduction (increase)
in the volatility of his own signal (of the signals of other market participants) whenever his
own signal is negatively correlated with the aggregated (weighted) signal of all other market
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participants. That is, the expected payoff of any agent improves if his signal becomes more
accurate, provided his signal is negatively correlated to the aggregated signal of all other
agents. This observation can be interpreted saying that, in this case, agents have an incentive
to improve their forecast skills (on this issue cf., e.g., Mikhail et al. (1999), Brav and Heaton
(2002) or Markov and Tamayo (2006)). On the other hand, if his signal is positively correlated
with the aggregated forecasts of all other market participants, a J-shaped relationship between
forecast accuracy and expected payoff exists. Such a non-monotonic relationship was first
reported in simulation studies by Schredelseker (1984, 2001) and empirically confirmed by
Huber (2007) and Huber et al. (2008). Our model provides a rigorous explanation for the
emergence of such effects.
Another implication of our analysis is that, for any agent, the impact of the correlation
between his own signal and the aggregated signal of all other participants on his expected
payoff depends on the accuracy of the signal: if the relative accuracy of this signal is above
(below) a certain threshold, the impact of an increase in correlation is positive (negative),
while for intermediate levels of accuracy the impact of correlation is non-monotonic. In this
sense our model offers an explanation of two (apparently) contradicting empirical observations
that have appeared in the literature, i.e. that analysts with a high reputation tend to issue
similar predictions (known as herding effect, see, e.g., Graham, 1999), as well as to produce
recommendations that deviate significantly from the consensus forecasts (see, e.g. Lamont,
2002), or to follow an anti-herding strategy (see, e.g. Bernhardt et al., 2006).
Finally, our model accommodates a full communication equilibrium in the sense of Radner
(1979), and this equilibrium is unique. If all available information is correctly reflected in the
market price, then the expected trading payoff of all analysts in our model is equal to zero.
The remaining content is organized as follows: in Section 2 we introduce the model (in
particular, we obtain an expression for the expected payoff of each agent), discuss some of its
implications through an accurate sensitivity analysis, and prove the existence and uniqueness
of a full communication equilibrium. In Section 3 we obtain the probability density function
and we compute moments of all orders for the payoff of each agent. A numerical example is
provided in Section 4, and Section 5 concludes.
Notation. We denote the Euclidean scalar product by 〈·, ·〉. The Gaussian law on Rn with
mean m and covariance matrix Q is denoted by NRn(m,Q), and we omit the subscript if the
space is clear. The distribution and density functions of the standard Gaussian law on R are
denoted by Φ and φ, respectively.
2 Model
In order to model incomplete information we assume that n risk-neutral market participants do
not know the true (or fair) value of a company. However, they process available information
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(e.g., accounting statements) and try to infer the true value of the firm (see, e.g., Barron
et al., 1998; Markov and Tamayo, 2006). Although we assume that each market participant
i, i = 1, 2, . . . , n, has an unbiased signal (i.e., forecast) ξi about the fair value, agents are
heterogeneous along two dimensions. In particular, agents differ in the precision of their
estimates. In this way we capture the idea that analysts might have distinct skills and/or data
at their disposal. Moreover, we assume that the correlation between individual forecasts may
differ among analysts (see, e.g., Fischer and Verrecchia, 1998). We assume that ξ = (ξ1, . . . , ξn)
is a vector of centered jointly Gaussian random variables with non-singular covariance matrix
Q.
According to their price forecasts, analysts submit conditional buy and sell orders. When-
ever the price is below his own estimate (p < ξi), analyst i is willing to buy and therefore
takes a long position, otherwise (p > ξi) he takes a short position. The true value is revealed
immediately after the trade. Following Fischer and Verrecchia (1998), we consider a dealer
market, i.e. we assume that a market maker clears the market by buying and selling for his
own account. We assume that this market maker sets the price p equal to a weighted average
of the different estimates, that is,
p :=
n∑
i=1
wiξi = 〈w, ξ〉, (1)
where w = (w1, . . . , wn) ∈ Rn,
∑
iwi = 1. In order to avoid degenerate (and trivial) cases, we
assume that at least two elements of w are not zero. Of course, setting the price equal to the
mean of the single estimates is a special case of this pricing mechanism. If the market maker
exploited additional information, then he could assign more weight to more accurate analysts.
This is in line with empirical studies which report higher price reactions to forecast revisions
of analysts with a higher reputation, see, e.g., Gleason and Lee (2003). Furthermore, as we
will show in Subsection 2.2, the linear pricing function (1) is flexible enough to incorporate
correctly all signals revealed by the market participants and to lead to a full communication
equilibrium in the sense of Radner (1979).
We assume, without loss of generality, that the true value of the asset is zero, and, in
analogy to Brav and Heaton (2002), we calculate the expected performance of all agents. For
notational convenience we focus on agent 1, but it is clear that the extension of our analysis to
the generic agent i, i ∈ {1, . . . , n}, is just a matter of relabeling. The expected trading payoff
of agent 1 is given by
µ1 := E
[
(0− p) sgn(ξ1 − p)
]
= −E[p sgn(ξ1 − p)],
where sgn : x 7→ 1]0,+∞[(x) − 1]−∞,0[(x) stands for the signum function. In particular, if the
forecast ξ1 is above the market price p, then agent 1 takes a long position with a payoff equal
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to (0−p), otherwise, if his forecast ξ1 is below the market price p, his payoff is equal to (p−0).
As a first step, we determine the joint distribution of ξ1 and p.
Lemma 2.1. Let Q1 denote the first row of the matrix Q. One has (ξ1, p) ∼ NR2(0, S), where
S =
[
q11 〈Q1, w〉
〈Q1, w〉 〈Qw,w〉
]
and detS > 0. In particular, one has (ξ1, p) = (aX+ bY, cY ) in law, where (X,Y ) ∼ NR2(0, I)
and
a :=
√
q11 − b2 > 0, b := 〈Q1, w〉√〈Qw,w〉 , c := √〈Qw,w〉 > 0.
Proof. Since (ξ1, p) = Aξ, where A : Rn → R2 is the linear map represented by the matrix
(which we denote by the same symbol, with an innocuous abuse of notation)
A =
[
1 0 · · · 0
w1 w2 · · · wn
]
, (2)
well-known results on Gaussian laws imply that (ξ1, p) ∼ NR2(0, S), where
S = AQA′ =
[
q11
∑n
j=1wjq1j∑n
i=1wiqi1
∑n
i,j=1wiwjqij
]
=
[
q11 〈Q1, w〉
〈Q1, w〉 〈Qw,w〉
]
. (3)
Note that, due to our assumptions on w, A has full rank, hence S is non-singular. In particular,
there exists an upper-triangular matrix B of the type
B =
[
a b
0 c
]
(4)
such that S = BB′. Elementary computations show that one has
a =
√
q11 − b2, b = 〈Q1, w〉√〈Qw,w〉 , c = √〈Qw,w〉.
Note that a is well defined (and strictly positive) because
q11 − b2 = q11〈Qw,w〉 − 〈Q1, w〉
2
〈Qw,w〉 =
detS
〈Qw,w〉 ,
where detS > 0 since, as remarked above, S is non-singular, and 〈Qw,w〉 > 0 because Q is
strictly positive definite and w 6= 0. Let Z := (X,Y ) ∼ NR2(0, I). Then the law of the random
vector BZ = (aX+bY, cY ) is N(0, BB′) = N(0, S), i.e. it coincides with the law of (ξ1, p).
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Writing
S =
[
Var ξ1 Cov(ξ1, p)
Cov(ξ1, p) Var p
]
=:
[
σ21 σ1p
σ1p σ
2
p
]
,
it is immediately seen that the following identities hold:
a =
√
σ21 −
(
σ1p
σp
)2
, b =
σ1p
σp
, c = σp.
As the main result of this section, in the following we derive a closed-form expression for the
expected payoff of the single agent.
Proposition 2.2. Let a, b, c be defined as in Lemma 2.1, and β := (c− b)/a. One has
µ1 = −E
[
p sgn(ξ1 − p)
]
=
2cβ√
2pi
√
1 + β2
.
Proof. Taking into account that a > 0, we can write
µ1 = −E
[
p sgn(ξ1 − p)
]
= −cE[Y sgn(aX + (b− c)Y )] = −cE[Y sgn(X − βY )].
The independence of X and Y yields
E
[
Y sgn(X − βY )] = EE[Y sgn(X − βY )∣∣Y ] = ∫
R
y E
[
sgn(X − βy)]φ(y) dy.
Observing that one has
E
[
sgn(X − βy)] = E 1{X>βy} − E 1{X<βy} = P(X > βy)− P(X < βy)
= 1− 2P(X < βy) = 1− 2Φ(βy),
we get, recalling that
∫
R yφ(y) dy = 0,
E
[
Y sgn(X − βY )] = ∫
R
y
(
1− 2Φ(βy))φ(y) dy = −2 ∫
R
Φ(βy) y φ(y) dy.
We thus have
µ1 = −cE
[
Y sgn(X − βY )] = 2c ∫
R
Φ(βy)yφ(y) dy.
Since φ′(y) = −yφ(y) and Φ′(βy) = βφ(βy), integration by parts yields, taking into account
that Φ is bounded and φ is rapidly decreasing at infinity,
µ1 = 2cβ
∫
R
φ(βy)φ(y) dy =
2cβ√
2pi
∫
R
1√
2pi
exp
(−(1 + β2)y2/2) dy.
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Figure 1: Expected gains for agent 1 given σp = 1
By the change of variable y = x/
√
1 + β2, one finally obtains
µ1 =
2cβ√
2pi
√
1 + β2
∫
R
1√
2pi
e−x
2/2 dx =
2cβ√
2pi
√
1 + β2
.
Remark 2.3. As shown in Section 3 below, it is possible to provide a complete probabilistic
characterization of the trading profit as a random variable, determining its density in closed
form.
Recalling the definitions of a, b, c and β, the expected payoff µ1 can also be written as
µ1 =
√
2/pi
σ2p − σ1p√
σ21 + σ
2
p − 2σ1p
=
√
2/pi
σ2p − σ1σpρ1p√
σ21 + σ
2
p − 2σ1σpρ1p
, (5)
where ]−1, 1[ 3 ρ1p := σ1p/(σ1σp) denotes the correlation between ξ1 and p. Compared to
previous (numerical) simulation studies, this closed-form solution allows for a thorough com-
parative static analysis. As can be seen from (5), (σ1, σr) 7→ µ1(σ1, σr) is homogeneous of
order 1. Therefore, without loss of generality, in Figure 2 we set σp = 1 and show the effect of
different levels of σ1 and ρ.
2.1 Sensitivity analysis
Let us introduce the random variable r := p− w1ξ1 =
∑n
k=2wkξk, and define
σ2r := Var(r), ρ1r :=
1
σ1σr
Cov(ξ1, r).
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In this section we analyze the impact on the expected payoff µ1 due to variations in the
parameters σ1, σr, and ρ1r. Note that one has
σ2p = Var(w1ξ1 + r) = w
2
1σ
2
1 + σ
2
r + 2w1σ1r = w
2
1σ
2
1 + σ
2
r + 2w1σ1σrρ1r,
σ1p = Cov(ξ1, w1ξ1 + r) = w1σ
2
1 + σ1r = w1σ
2
1 + σ1σrρ1r,
which implies, by (5),
µ1 = µ1(σ1, σr, ρ1r) = −
√
2/pi
w1(1− w1)σ21 − σ2r + (1− 2w1)ρ1rσrσ1√
(w1 − 1)2σ21 + σ2r − 2(1− w1)ρ1rσrσ1
. (6)
Proposition 2.4. The following properties of the function σ1 7→ µ1(σ1, σr, ρ1r) hold:
(a) it is strictly decreasing if ρ1r ≤ 0;
(b) if ρ1r > 0, there exists σ¯1 > 0 such that it is strictly increasing on ]0, σ¯1] and strictly
decreasing on [σ¯1,∞[.
Proof. (a) Let us write
µ1 = −
√
2/pi
aσ21 + bσ1 − c√
ασ21 − βσ1 + c
,
where
a := w1(1− w1) > 0, b := (1− 2w1)ρ1rσr,
c := σ2r > 0, α := (1− w1)2 > 0,
β := 2(1− w1)ρ1rσr.
After a few tedious but straightforward calculations, one gets
∂µ1
∂σ1
= −
√
2/pi
(
ασ21 − βσ1 + c
)−3/2
g(σ1),
where
g(x) = aαx3 − 3
2
aβx2 +
(
(2a+ α)c− bβ/2)x+ (b− β/2)c
=: a3x
3 + a2x
2 + a1x+ a0
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and
a3 = w1(1− w1)3 > 0,
a2 = −3w1(1− w1)2σrρ1r,
a1 = σ
2
r (1− w1)
(
(1 + 2ρ21r)w1 + 1− ρ21r
)
> 0,
a0 = −w1σ3rρ1r.
It is thus immediately seen that, if ρ1r ≤ 0, then g(x) > 0 for all x ≥ 0, which proves (a).
(b) We are going to show that, independently of the value of ρ1r > 0, the function g is strictly
increasing. In fact, one has g′(x) = 3a3x2 + 2a2x+ a1, whose discriminant a22 − 3a1a3 has the
same sign of (1 + w1)(ρ
2
1r − 1), which is clearly negative. Therefore, g′(x) > 0 for all x ≥ 0,
hence g is strictly increasing. In particular, since g(0) = a0 < 0 and limx→+∞ g(x) = +∞, it
follows that g has only one positive root σ¯1, with g(x) < 0 for all x ∈ [0, σ¯1[ and g(x) > 0 for
all x ∈ ]σ¯1,+∞[, which proves (b).
Therefore, if the signal is negatively correlated with the aggregated signal of the others,
then – ceteris paribus – a reduction in the volatility of the signal always increases the expected
payoff. Our model is therefore at least partially consistent with empirical results reported in
Mikhail et al. (1999), where single market participants have an incentive to acquire and process
information in order to improve their forecast ability. On the other hand, it should be stressed
that an improvement of the precision of the signal (i.e. a reduction of σ1) does not always
imply a higher expected payoff. In particular, if the signal of agent 1 is positively correlated
with the aggregated signal of all other agents, the effect of a decrease in σ1 on µ1 depends, in
a complex way, on all parameters of the model. We shall see that an analogous non-monotonic
relationship holds with respect to variations in σr.
Proposition 2.5. The following properties of the function σr 7→ µ1(σ1, σr, ρ1r) hold:
(a) it is strictly increasing if ρ1r ≤ 0;
(b) if ρ1r > 0, there exists σ¯r > 0 such that it is strictly decreasing on ]0, σ¯r] and strictly
increasing on [σ¯r,∞[.
Proof. Since (σ1, σr) 7→ µ1(σ1, σr) is homogeneous of order 1, Euler’s theorem yields
σ1
∂µ1
∂σ1
(σ1, σr) + σr
∂µ1
∂σr
(σ1, σr) = µ1(σ1, σr), (7)
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hence
∂µ1
∂σr
=
1
σr
(
µ1 − σ1∂µ1
∂σ1
)
=
√
2/pi
σr
(
ασ21 − βσ1 + c
)−3/2(
σ1g(σ1)−
(
aσ21 + bσ1 − c
)(
ασ21 − βσ1 + c
))
=
√
2/pi
σr
(
ασ21 − βσ1 + c
)−3/2(
(−aβ/2− bα)σ31 +
(
c(a+ 2α) + bβ/2
)
σ21+
− 3
2
cβσ1 + c
2
)
=
√
2/pi
(
ασ21 − βσ1 + c
)−3/2(
σ3r + a1σ1σ
2
r + a2σ
2
1σr + a3σ
3
1
)
=
√
2/pi
(
ασ21 − βσ1 + c
)−3/2
h(σr),
where h(x) := x3 + a1σ1x
2 + a2σ
2
1x+ a3σ
3
1 and
a3 :=
−aβ/2− bα
σr
= −(1− w1)3ρ1r,
a2 :=
c(a+ 2α) + bβ/2
σ2r
= w21(1 + 2ρ
2
1r)− 3w1(1 + ρ21r) + 2 + ρ21r,
a1 :=
−3cβ/2
σ3r
= −3(1− w1)ρ1r.
Let us first show that a2 > 0: in fact, looking at the above definition of a2 as a polynomial in
w1, its roots are
3(1 + ρ21r)± (1− ρ21r)
2 + 4ρ21r
≥ 1.
(a) Since a1, a2, a3 > 0, Descartes’ rule of signs implies that h has no positive roots. Moreover,
since h(0) = σ31a3 > 0, we conclude that h(x) > 0 for all x > 0, i.e. ∂µ1/∂σr > 0.
(b) Note that h is strictly increasing: in fact, one has h′(x) = 3x2 + 2a1σ1x + a2σ21, and the
discriminant of this polynomial is proportional to
a21 − 3a2 = 3(1− ρ21r)(1− w1)(w1 − 2) < 0.
Since a3 < 0 implies that h(0) < 0, we conclude that h admits exactly one positive root σ¯r, as
well as that h is negative on [0, σ¯r] and positive on ]σ¯r,+∞[.
Note that the first statement of the previous Proposition simply says that, if ρ1r ≤ 0, the
expected payoff µ1 improves as σr increases, i.e. agent 1 obtains a higher payoff as the relative
accuracy of his own signal improves. On the other hand, if ρ1r > 0, in analogy to Proposition
2.4, the relationship between µ1 and σr is no longer monotonic and is determined in a complex
way by all parameters of the model. This J-shaped relationship between forecast precision
and trading profitability was first reported in simulation studies by Schredelseker (1984, 2001)
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and also documented in experimental works by Huber (2007) and Huber et al. (2008). The
authors use a cumulative information setting which implies a positive pairwise correlation.
In the numerical example of Section 4 we adopt this setting, thus reproducing the behavior
observed in the above mentioned papers.
It should be remarked that, even though Propositions 2.4 and 2.5 are qualitatively very
similar, it is not true in general that ∂µ1/∂σ1(σ1, σr) > 0 implies ∂µ1/∂σr(σ1, σr) < 0 for
all σ1, σr, as it can be immediately realized looking at (7). More precise information on the
values of the parameters determining the signs of µ1 and of its partial derivatives can be easily
obtained.
Proposition 2.6. Let σ1, σr be fixed positive constants, and α+ = α+(ρ1r) be defined as in
(8) below. The function ρ1r 7→ µ1(σ1, σr, ρ1r) is locally decreasing if σr < α+σ1 and locally
increasing if σr > α+σ1.
Proof. One has, setting α := σr/σ1,
∂µ1
∂ρ1r
=
√
2/pi A−3
[
(1− w1)(1− 2w1)σ21σ2rρ+ w1σ1σ3r − (1− w1)3σ31σr
]
=
√
2/pi A−3σ31σr
[
w1α
2 + (1− w1)(1− 2w1)ρ1rα− (1− w1)3
]
,
where A denotes the denominator of the fraction appearing in (6). Then the sign of ∂µ1/∂ρ1r
is equal to the sign of the polynomial in α
w1α
2 + (1− w1)(1− 2w1)ρ1rα− (1− w1)3,
whose roots α− < 0 < α+ are
α± := (1− w1)−(1− 2w1)ρ1r ±
√
(1− 2w1)2ρ21r + 4w1(1− w1)
2w1
. (8)
In particular, if σr/σ1 < α+, then ∂µ1/∂ρ1r is negative; if σr/σ1 > α+, then ∂µ1/∂ρ1r is
positive.
Corollary 2.7. Let σ1, σr > 0 be given, and define
` :=
1− w1
2w1
(√
(1− 2w1)2 + 4w1(1− w1)− |1− 2w1|
)
,
u :=
1− w1
2w1
(√
(1− 2w1)2 + 4w1(1− w1) + |1− 2w1|
)
.
If σr/σ1 ∈ [`, u], then
(a) if w1 < 1/2, then there exists ρ¯ such that ρ1r 7→ µ1(ρ1r) is decreasing on [−1, ρ¯] and
increasing on [ρ¯, 1];
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(b) if w1 > 1/2, then there exists ρ¯ such that ρ1r 7→ µ1(ρ1r) is increasing on [−1, ρ¯] and
decreasing on [ρ¯, 1];
Otherwise, if σr/σ1 < `, then ρ1r 7→ µ1(ρ1r) is decreasing on [−1, 1]; if σr/σ1 > u, then
ρ1r 7→ µ1(ρ1r) is increasing on [−1, 1].
Proof. Note that one has
∂α+
∂ρ1r
=
1− w1
2w1
−a
√
a2ρ21r + b+ a
2ρ1r√
a2ρ21r + b
,
where
a := 1− 2w1, b := 4w1(1− w1) > 0,
therefore ∂α+/∂ρ1r > 0 if and only if
a2ρ1r > a
√
a2ρ21r + b.
Simple calculations immediately reveal that this inequality is always satisfied if a = 1−2w1 < 0,
and never satisfied if a = 1− 2w1 > 0. Equivalently, ρ1r 7→ α+(ρ1r) is increasing if w1 > 1/2,
and decreasing if w1 < 1/2. To complete the proofs it is enough to observe that one has
α+(−1) = 1− w1
2w1
(
(1− 2w1) +
√
(1− 2w1)2 + 4w1(1− w1)
)
α+(1) =
1− w1
2w1
(
−(1− 2w1) +
√
(1− 2w1)2 + 4w1(1− w1)
)
.
To describe the relationship between the expect payoff of agent 1 and the correlation
coefficient ρ1r we can thus distinguish three regimes: if the relative accuracy of his signal is
low (σr/σ1 < `), then, for any ρir ∈ [−1, 1], agent 1 gains from a decline in the correlation
between his signal and the aggregated signal of all other agents; if the relative accuracy of
his signal is high (σr/σ1 > u), then, for any ρir ∈ [−1, 1], agent 1 gains from an increase
in correlation; if the (inverse) relative accuracy σr/σ1 falls within the interval [`, u], then the
dependence of µ1 on ρ1r turns out to be non-monotonic. In the first two cases, i.e. when
the (inverse) relative accuracy σr/σ1 falls above u or below `, the result can be heuristically
motivated as follows: if agent 1 overestimates (underestimates) the true value, then the market
price will be even higher (lower) than his signal. According to his decision rule (buying when
the signal is above the market price and selling when the signal is below the market price),
he will then take the correct trading position. Moreover, note that, in the third regime, if
w1 < 1/2 the function ρ1r 7→ µ1(ρ1r) has exactly one global minimum, which implies a higher
expected payoff for extreme (either positive or negative) rather than for intermediate levels
of correlation. This result hence offers a complete explanation of the contradicting empirical
observations according to which analysts with a high reputation tend to herd (see, e.g. Graham,
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1999), as well as to deviate more drastically from the consensus forecast (see, e.g., Lamont,
2002; Bernhardt et al., 2006).
2.2 Full Communication Equilibrium
In Section 2.1 we consider naive investors who trade on the basis of their individual signals. We
propose a one-period model where the true value of the firm, and therefore gains and losses of
each analyst, are revealed immediately after the trade. Of course, in the long run the different
agents will participate to the market only under the condition that the expected payoff is not
negative. This holds also for the market marker, whose expected payoff – by definition of a
dealer market – is given by the negative sum of the single µi’s. In order to avoid a breakdown
of trading as described by the theory of lemon markets and given the zero-sum property of the
game, an equilibrium implies that the expected payoff of each agent must be equal to zero (i.e,
µi = 0 ∀i = 1, . . . , n). A natural question is whether our model, where prices are equal to a
weighted average of the single signals, see (1), is able to accommodate such an equilibrium.
In order to keep the market alive, the market maker will have an interest to ensure a level
playing field for all participants. He could use the observed covariance matrix Q and the single
signals ξi revealed by the conditional orders to set the price. Using the model of Black and
Litterman (1992) with non-informative priors, one obtains the following choice for the price:
p∗ := 〈Q−11,1〉−1〈Q−11, ξ〉, which corresponds in (1) to
w∗ := 〈Q−11,1〉−1(Q−11). (9)
If market prices are fully revealing all available information, then the market is said to be in
a full communication equilibrium (see Radner, 1979). With this choice of w one has, for any
k ∈ {1, 2, . . . , n},
σkp = 〈Qk, w∗〉 = 〈Q
−1Q1,1〉
〈Q−11,1〉 =
〈ek,1〉
〈Q−11,1〉 =
1
〈Q−11,1〉 = 〈Qw
∗, w∗〉 = σ2p,
hence, by (5), in equilibrium the expected payoff of all market participants is zero. As a
consequence, the expected payoff of the market marker is also equal to zero. According to
Radner (1979) any fully-revealing communication equilibrium is also a fully-revealing rational
expectation equilibrium. Let us show that, in fact, such equilibrium is unique, in the sense of
the following Proposition.
Proposition 2.8. There exists one and only one vector w ∈ Rn, with ∑nk=1wk = 1, such that
µi = 0 for all i = 1, 2, . . . , n.
Proof. It is enough to show that there exists a unique vector w ∈ Rn with ∑nk=1wk = 1, such
that
〈Qw,w〉 = 〈Qk, w〉 ∀k = 1, . . . , n. (10)
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Existence has already been proved by explicitly constructing a solution w∗. It is thus enough to
prove uniqueness. Condition (10) implies 〈Q1, w〉 = 〈Qk, w〉 for all k > 1, hence 〈Q1−Qk, w〉 =
0 for all k > 1. This in turn implies w ∈ V ⊥, where
V = span(Q1 −Q2, . . . , Q1 −Qn),
and V ⊥ stands for the orthogonal complement of V in Rn, so that Rn = V ⊕ V ⊥. Since Q is
assumed to be non-singular, the vectors Q1, . . . , Qn are linearly independent, hence dimV =
n − 1, which implies that dimV ⊥ = 1. Since w∗ 6= 0, then w∗ is a generator of V ⊥. In
particular, 0 6= w ∈ V ⊥ implies that there exists α 6= 0 such that w = αw∗. Then 1 =∑n
k=1wk = α
∑n
k=1w
∗
k = α yields the uniqueness of w
∗.
3 Density function of the payoff
In the previous section we have presented a closed-form solution for the expected trading payoffs
of the single agents, see (5). As a matter of fact, we can give a complete characterization of
trading payoffs as random variables. In this section we provide a closed-form expression for the
density of the payoff for each agent. Throughout the section we adopt the notation introduced
in Lemma 2.1 and Proposition 2.2.
We begin with an auxiliary result, which might be interesting in its own right.
Proposition 3.1. Let
F (x1, x2) := P
(
p ≤ x1, sgn(ξ1 − p) = x2
)
, x1 ∈ R, x2 ∈ {−1, 1},
denote the joint distribution of p and sgn(ξ1 − p). One has
F (x1, x2;β) = Φ(x1/c)Φ(−βx1x2/c)− x2
2pi
arctan(1/β)+x2 sgnβ
(
1
4
+
∫ |β|
c
x1
0
Φ(z/|β|)φ(z) dz
)
.
Proof. By Lemma 2.1, there exist a > 0, b ∈ R and c > 0 such that p = cY and ξ1 = aX + bY
in law, where X and Y are independent standard Gaussian random variables. Setting β =
(c− b)/a, one has
F (x1, x2) = P
(
Y ≤ x1/c, sgn(X − βY ) = x2
)
.
Let us record, for later use, the following obvious observation:
Φ(x1/c) = P(Y ≤ x1/c) = P
(
Y ≤ x1/c, sgn(X − βY ) = −1
)
+ P
(
Y ≤ x1/c, sgn(X − βY ) = 1
)
= F (x1,−1) + F (x1, 1).
14
Let us consider first the case β > 0: one has
F (x1,−1) = P
(
Y ≤ x1/c, sgn(X − βY ) = −1
)
= P
(
Y ≤ x1/c, X < βY
)
,
where we have used the fact that a > 0, c > 0. Hence
F (x1,−1) = P
(
X/β ≤ Y ≤ x1/c
)
=
∫ β
c
x1
−∞
P(z/β ≤ Y ≤ x1/c)φ(z) dz
= Φ(x1/c)Φ(βx1/c)−
∫ β
c
x1
−∞
Φ(z/β)φ(z) dz.
Appealing to Lemma A.1, we end up with
F (x1,−1) = Φ(x1/c)Φ(βx1/c)− 1
4
+
1
2pi
arctan(1/β)−
∫ β
c
x1
0
Φ(z/β)φ(z) dz.
The expression for F (x1, 1) is obtained as follows:
F (x1, 1) = Φ(x1/c)− F (x1,−1)
= Φ(x1/c)
(
1− Φ(βx1/c)
)
+
1
4
− 1
2pi
arctan(1/β) +
∫ β
c
x1
0
Φ(z/β)φ(z) dz
= Φ(x1/c)Φ(−βx1/c) + 1
4
− 1
2pi
arctan(1/β) +
∫ β
c
x1
0
Φ(z/β)φ(z) dz
Let us now consider the case β < 0: by a reasoning completely analogous to the one used
above, we can write
F (x1, 1) = P
(
Y ≤ x1/c, X/β ≤ Y
)
= P(X/β ≤ Y ≤ x1/c)
=
∫ ∞
β
c
x1
P(z/β ≤ Y ≤ x1/c)φ(z) dz
= Φ(x1/c)Φ(−βx1/c)−
∫ −β
c
x1
−∞
Φ(−z/β)φ(z) dz
= Φ(x1/c)Φ(−βx1/c)− 1
4
− 1
2pi
arctan(1/β)−
∫ |β|
c
x1
0
Φ(z/|β|)φ(z) dz,
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hence also
F (x1,−1) = Φ(x1/c)− F (x1, 1)
= Φ(x1/c)
(
1− Φ(−βx1/c)
)
+
1
4
+
1
2pi
arctan(1/β) +
∫ |β|
c
x1
0
Φ(z/|β|)φ(z) dz
= Φ(x1/c)Φ(βx1/c) +
1
4
+
1
2pi
arctan(1/β) +
∫ |β|
c
x1
0
Φ(z/|β|)φ(z) dz.
We may thus write
F (x1,−1) = Φ(x1/c)Φ(βx1/c) + 1
2pi
arctan(1/β)− sgnβ
(
1
4
+
∫ |β|
c
x1
0
Φ(z/β)φ(z) dz
)
,
F (x1, 1) = Φ(x1/c)Φ(−βx1/c)− 1
2pi
arctan(1/β) + sgnβ
(
1
4
+
∫ |β|
c
x1
0
Φ(z/β)φ(z) dz
)
,
that are equivalent to the claim.
Remark 3.2. The joint distribution of p and sgn(ξ1−p) can alternatively be expressed in terms
of the bivariate Gaussian law. Consider, for instance, the case β > 0 and x2 = −1: Lemma
A.2 yields
F (x1,−1) = Φ(x1/c)Φ(βx1/c)−
∫ β
c
x1
−∞
Φ(z/β)φ(z) dz
= Φ(x1/c)Φ(βx1/c)− Φ2
(
βx1/c, 0;− 1√
1 + β2
)
,
where Φ2(·, ·; ρ) denotes the distribution function of a bivariate Gaussian random variable with
correlation coefficient ρ.
The following Proposition is the main result of this section and of the whole paper.
Proposition 3.3. Let M = p sgn(ξ1 − p) denote the negative payoff of agent 1. The random
variable M has a (smooth) density fM given by
fM (z) =
2
c
φ(z/c)Φ(−βz/c).
Proof. Let us first compute the distribution FM (z) := P(M ≤ z) of the random variable M .
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One has
FM (z) = P(p sgn(ξ1 − p) ≤ z)
= P
(
p sgn(ξ1 − p) ≤ z, sgn(ξ1 − p) = −1
)
+ P
(
p sgn(ξ1 − p) ≤ z, sgn(ξ1 − p) = 1
)
= P
(
p ≥ −z, sgn(ξ1 − p) = −1
)
+ P
(
p ≤ z, sgn(ξ1 − p) = 1
)
= P(sgn(ξ1 − p) = −1)− F (−z,−1) + F (z, 1),
where F denotes the joint distribution of p and sgn(ξ1 − p), and
P(sgn(ξ1 − p) = −1) = P(X ≤ βY ) = 1/2,
which follows immediately because X and Y are independent, symmetric, and have a continu-
ous distribution: P(X ≤ βY ) + P(X ≥ βY ) = 1, but P(X ≥ βY ) = P(−X ≥ −βY ) = P(X ≤
βY ).
Thanks to Proposition 3.1, one has
FM (z) = Cβ+
(
2Φ(z/c)−1)Φ(−βz/c)+sgnβ(∫ − |β|c z
0
Φ(y/|β|)φ(y) dy +
∫ |β|
c
z
0
Φ(y/|β|)φ(y) dy
)
,
where Cβ denotes a constant that depends only on β, hence
fM (z) =
d
dz
FM (z) =
2
c
φ(z/c)Φ(−βz/c)− β
c
φ(βz/c)
(
2Φ(z/c)− 1)
+ sgnβ
( |β|
c
Φ(z/c)φ(|β|z/c)− |β|
c
Φ(−z/c)φ(−|β|z/c)
)
=
2
c
φ(z/c)Φ(−βz/c) + β
c
φ(βz/c)− 2β
c
Φ(z/c)φ(βz/c)
+
β
c
Φ(z/c)φ(βz/c)− β
c
Φ(−z/c)φ(βz/c)
=
2
c
φ(z/c)Φ(−βz/c) + β
c
φ(βz/c)− β
c
φ(βz/c)
(
Φ(z/c) + Φ(−z/c))
=
2
c
φ(z/c)Φ(−βz/c).
It is immediately seen that the density of the random variable −M , which represents the
trading payoff of agent 1, is given by
f−M (z) = fM (−z) = 2
c
φ(z/c)Φ(βz/c).
3.1 Higher moments
Given the complete probabilistic characterization of the (negative) trading profit M just ob-
tained, one can compute any moment of M simply integrating against the density fM . It is
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easier, however, to proceed differently.
For an odd number 2k − 1, k ∈ N, we define (2k − 1)!! := ∏kj=1(2j − 1), and set, by
convention, (−1)!! := 1.
Proposition 3.4. Let k ∈ N. One has
EM2k = (2k − 1)!! 〈Qw,w〉k,
EM2k−1 = −2
k(k − 1)! c2k−1β√
2pi(1 + β2)
k−1∑
j=0
(2j − 1)!!
(2j)!!
1
(1 + β2)j
.
Proof. Since M2k = p2k, and p = 〈w, ξ〉 is a centered Gaussian random variable with variance
〈Qw,w〉, standard formulas for moments of Gaussian laws give
EM2k = E p2k = E〈w, ξ〉2k = (2k − 1)!! 〈Qw,w〉k.
Moreover, by Lemma 2.1, one has
EM2k+1 = E p2k+1 sgn(ξ1 − p) = c2k+1 EY 2k+1 sgn(X − βY )
= c2k+1
∫
R
y2k+1 E [sgn(X − βy)] φ(y) dy,
where E [sgn(X − βy)] = 1− 2Φ(βy), hence
EM2k+1 = −2c2k+1
∫
R
y2k+1Φ(βy)φ(y) dy. (11)
Note that, setting v(y) = y2kφ(y), one has
v′(y) =
(
2ky2k−1 − y2k+1)φ(y),
hence, integrating by parts in (11),∫
R
Φ(βy) y2k+1φ(y) dy =
∫
R
Φ(βy)
(
y2k+1 − 2ky2k−1)φ(y) dy
+ 2k
∫
R
Φ(βy) y2k−1φ(y) dy
= β
∫
R
y2kφ(βy)φ(y) dy + 2k
∫
R
Φ(βy) y2k−1φ(y) dy,
(12)
where, setting σβ := (1 + β
2)−1/2 for convenience of notation, and recalling again standard
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formulas for moments of Gaussian laws,∫
R
y2kφ(βy)φ(y) dy =
(
2pi(1 + β2)
)−1/2 1
σβ
√
2pi
∫
R
y2ke−y
2/(2σ2β) dy
=
(
2pi(1 + β2)
)−1/2
(2k − 1)!! (1 + β2)−k.
Therefore, setting
fk :=
∫
R
Φ(βy) y2k−1φ(y) dy,
ak :=
β√
2pi(1 + β2)
(2k − 1)!! (1 + β2)−k,
(12) can be written as
fk+1 − 2kfk = ak, f1 = β√
2pi(1 + β2)
.
Dividing both sides of this difference equation by 2kk!, we are left with
fk+1
2k k!
− fk
2k−1 (k − 1)! =
ak
2k k!
,
hence, setting
gk :=
fk
2k−1 (k − 1)! , bk :=
ak
2k k!
,
the previous difference equation is equivalent to
gk+1 − gk = bk, g1 = β√
2pi(1 + β2)
,
which can be easily solved, writing the telescoping sum
gk − g1 = (gk − gk−1) + (gk−1 − gk−2) + · · ·+ (g2 − g1)
= bk−1 + bk−2 + · · ·+ b1,
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which yields
fk = 2
k−1(k − 1)! gk = 2k−1(k − 1)!
(
g1 +
k−1∑
j=1
bj
)
= 2k−1(k − 1)!
(
β√
2pi(1 + β2)
+
β√
2pi(1 + β2)
k−1∑
j=1
(2j − 1)!!
2jj!
1
(1 + β2)j
)
=
2k−1(k − 1)!β√
2pi(1 + β2)
k−1∑
j=0
(2j − 1)!!
(2j)!!
1
(1 + β2)j
.
By definition of fk and (11) one finally obtains
EM2k−1 = −2c2k−1fk = −2
k(k − 1)! c2k−1β√
2pi(1 + β2)
k−1∑
j=0
(2j − 1)!!
(2j)!!
1
(1 + β2)j
.
It is immediately seen that the moments of the payoff −M of even degree coincide with
those of M , while the moments of odd degree are equal in absolute value, but with opposite
sign. Moreover, centered moments can easily be obtained by the non-central one just derived.
4 Numerical example
In this section we illustrate our main results with a numerical example. We assume that
four agents, labeled by i ∈ {1, . . . , 4}, participate to the market. The covariance matrix Q of
their signals is displayed in Table 1 below. The analysts are labeled according to their forecast
precision (measured by the standard deviation σi of their signals), in reverse order. The market
maker assigns equal weight (wi = 0.25) to each signal. The numerical values chosen here try to
mimic models with a cumulative information structure (see Schredelseker, 1984, 2001), where
analysts with an intermediate accuracy implicitly face the highest correlation (note that the
signal of agent 1 is less correlated with other agents’ signals than the signal of agent 2).
i σi C Q
1 1.3 1 0.9 0.6 0.3 1.690 1.404 0.858 0.390
2 1.2 0.9 1 0.8 0.6 1.404 1.440 1.056 0.720
3 1.1 0.6 0.8 1 0.7 0.858 1.056 1.210 0.770
4 1 0.3 0.6 0.7 1 0.390 0.720 0.770 1.000
Table 1: Signal structure of the numerical example: C and Q denote the correlation matrix
and the covariance matrix, respectively.
In the following we compare the payoffs of all analysts. We use the formulas of the previous
section to calculate the first four central moments.1 Table 2 shows that, although analyst 1
1Note that central moments can be immediately obtained from the non-central moments of Section 3.1.
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i µi σ
2
i ςi κi
1 -0.115 0.970 -0.001 2.825
2 -0.406 0.819 -0.029 2.018
3 0.016 0.983 0.000 2.900
4 0.285 0.902 0.010 2.444
Table 2: Higher moments of the payoff for analysts i = 1, . . . , 4: ςi and κi denote the skewness
and kurtosis of agent i, respectively.
Figure 2: Density function for the payoffs of analysts i = 1, . . . , 4.
has a less accurate signal than analyst 2 (with a resulting higher variance and kurtosis in the
payoffs), his expected payoff is better. Obviously, analyst 2 suffers from his high correlation
with all other market participants, which is also reflected in a more negative skewness.
Therefore, our model reproduces the non-monotone relationship between forecast precision
and trading profitability observed in Schredelseker (1984, 2001). Figure 2 shows the density
function of the payoff for all analysts. Figure 3 shows the dependence of the expected payoff of
agent 1 on the accuracy of his own signal (as measured by the standard deviation σ1) and on
the correlation between his signal ξ1 and the aggregated signal of all other agents r. The value
of σr is equal to 0.739. The non-monotonic relationship between µ1 and σ1 is clearly displayed
for some positive values of ρ1r. Moreover, while for large (small) values of σ1 the expected
payoff is decreasing (increasing) as ρ1r increases, for intermediate values of σ1 a non-monotonic
behaviour can be observed. Given w1 = 0.25 < 1/2, µ1 is first decreasing and then increasing
in ρ1r.
5 Conclusion
We propose a model in which analysts differ in the precision of their signals as well as in the
correlation between each other. We provide a complete characterization of the trading payoff
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Figure 3: Expected payoff of analysts 1 as function of σ1 and ρ1r, with σr = 0.739.
of each agent, obtaining its probability density function in closed form, as well as explicit
expressions for its moments of all orders. Such precise description allows us to perform a
detailed sensitivity analysis, with the following implications: If the forecasts of an analyst
are negatively correlated with the aggregated forecasts of the others, then he always takes
advantage of improving his forecast skills. If the correlation between the forecasts is positive,
then a non-monotonic relationship between forecast precision and trading profitability exists.
Furthermore, the impact of correlation on the expected payoff of an analyst depends on the
relative accuracy of his signal: if the relative accuracy is below (above) a certain threshold,
then he suffers (benefits) from an increasing correlation, while for intermediate levels of relative
accuracy the relationship is non-monotonic.
This is the first time, to the best of our knowledge, that an analytical model is proposed,
which fully explains the non-trivial interplay between forecast accuracy and trading perfor-
mance. Our model recovers as special cases previous (partial) results from simulation studies,
and is able to explain the different – sometimes contradicting – empirical observations reported
in the literature. Finally, we provide strong evidence that empirical studies on the relationship
between forecast precision and trading profitability need to take into account the correlation
structure of the forecasts.
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A Appendix
Lemma A.1. Let a ∈ R. One has∫ ∞
0
Φ(ax)φ(x) dx =
1
4
+
1
2pi
arctan a,∫ 0
−∞
Φ(ax)φ(x) dx =
1
4
− 1
2pi
arctan a.
Proof. For a > 0 one has
Φ(ax) =
1
2
+
∫ ax
0
φ(y) dy ∀x ≥ 0,
hence ∫ ∞
0
Φ(ax)φ(x) dx =
∫ ∞
0
(
1
2
+
∫ ax
0
φ(y) dy
)
φ(x) dx =
1
4
+
∫
Da
φ2(x, y) dx dy,
where R2 ⊃ Da :=
{
0 ≤ x < ∞, 0 ≤ y ≤ ax} and φ2 stands for the density of the standard
Gaussian measure on R2. Since Da is a cone of R2 with vertex at the origin and aperture
equal to arctan a, taking the rotational invariance of φ2 into account (or, equivalently, passing
to radial coordinates), we have ∫
Da
φ2(x, y) dx dy =
arctan a
2pi
.
Let us now assume a < 0. Then Φ(ax) = 1−Φ(|a|x) for all x ≥ 0, hence, recalling that arctan
is odd,∫ ∞
0
Φ(ax)φ(x) dx =
1
2
−
∫ ∞
0
Φ(|a|x)φ(x) dx = 1
2
− 1
4
− arctan |a|
2pi
=
1
4
+
arctan a
2pi
.
The first identity is thus proved. The second follows immediately:∫ 0
−∞
Φ(ax)φ(x) dx =
∫ ∞
0
Φ(−ax)φ(x) dx =
∫ ∞
0
(
1−Φ(ax))φ(x) dx = 1
2
−1
4
− 1
2pi
arctan a.
Lemma A.2. One has ∫ y
−∞
Φ(bx)φ(x) dx = Φ2
(
y, 0;−b(1 + b2)−1/2)
Proof. It is enough to write
Φ(bx) =
∫ bx
−∞
φ(z) dz =
∫ 0
−∞
φ(z + bx) dz =
√
b2 + 1
∫ 0
−∞
φ(z
√
b2 + 1 + bx) dz,
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which implies∫ y
−∞
Φ(bx)φ(x) dx =
√
b2 + 1
2pi
∫
Ξy
exp
(
−1
2
(
(b2 + 1)x2 + 2b(b2 + 1)1/2xz + (b2 + 1)z2
))
dx dz,
where R2 ⊃ Ξy := ]−∞, y]× ]−∞, 0]. Writing
(b2 + 1)x2 + 2b(b2 + 1)1/2xz + (b2 + 1)z2 = (b2 + 1)
(
x2 + z2 − 2 −b√
b2 + 1
xz
)
=
1
1− ρ2
(
x2 − 2ρxz + z2),
with ρ := − b
(b2 + 1)1/2
, we are left with
∫ y
−∞
Φ(bx)φ(x) dx =
∫
Ξy
f(x, z;R) dx dz,
where f(·, ·;R) denotes the density of NR2(0, R), with
R =
[
1 ρ
ρ 1
]
=
 1 −
b√
b2 + 1
− b√
b2 + 1
1
 .
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